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Roughly four out of five employees of state and local governments in the United States are covered by a defined benefit pension (DB) plan, versus only around one in five private sector workers. Prior to the financial market disruptions of recent years, public sector pensions were well funded, at least according to their own accounting conventions.
1 As of 2007, the average public pension plan was 84.6 percent funded. In 2009, by contrast, the average public pension plan was only 77.1 percent funded.
2
This decline in pension health was largely due to a precipitous decline in pension assets.
These plans had increasingly invested in equities, rising from roughly one third of pension portfolios prior to the mid-1980s, to around two thirds of assets prior to the financial crisis.
3 While higher expected returns on equities allowed states to reduce pension funding from around 6 percent of state budgets through the mid-1980s to around 3 percent prior to the crisis 4 , the downside is higher sensitivity to annual market returns. According to the Federal Reserve, state and local pension assets declined by nearly $1 trillion from [2007] [2008] and have yet to regain their former value.
Since public pension plans generally assume an 8 percent return on assets, this implies that, even today, plan assets are more than 25 percent below levels projected as of 2007. Indeed, even if public plans returned 11.5 percent annually going forward, it would take them until 2020
to catch up to asset levels projected prior to the financial crisis. This raises the question of how public sector pensions have reacted to such changes. As a matter of law and general plan stewardship, many plans have increased contributions for employers and/or participants, helping assets catch up more quickly with projected liabilities. Such changes have been the subject of 2 political debate in many states and localities. A number of states have attempted to reduce the generosity of benefits, principally for newly-hired employees but, in some cases, for current employees and retirees through reductions in post-retirement Cost of Living Adjustments (Pew 2011). Public plan changes for current employees are often legally problematic, and it is likely that many will be settled in court.
Here, however, we focus on investment practices to ask whether public pensions altered their investment plans since the financial crisis, and if so, how? One hypothesis is that public pensions, with their focus on longer time horizons, would make few changes to their investment practices in response to the large market shifts. Alternately, either increased or decreased risktaking are also plausible. Following the financial crisis and the increased attention to the differences in risk between public pension assets and liabilities, some plans might reduce the risk profile of their pension investments. Yet, other underfunded pensions might seek to recoup their losses by taking even more investment risk. This could be portrayed as an irrational reaction, similar to a gambler 'doubling down' on risk, to make up for prior losses. Different plans in different circumstances could react in different ways. 
Data employed
We use several sources of data to examine public plan financing and investments. For Target portfolios. It should be borne in mind that the changes in asset allocations shown above
were not primarily the result of manager choice. Rather, changing market values caused an involuntary change in most public plan portfolio allocations. To learn more about how intentions regarding asset management changed since the beginning of the financial crisis, next we turn to public pension target asset allocations. The boards of most public sector plans set and disclose a target asset allocation that they will seek to reach and maintain over a period of time. How these targets change over time reveals changing management attitudes to different asset classes and to the overall risk profile that the plan seeks to maintain.
To gather information on target portfolio allocations, we focused on the 2007 and 2010
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) of 29 large public pension funds, with assets representing around half of total public funds under management. For each plan, we found the target allocation as printed in the CAFR, then tabulated those targets into five broad categories:
equities, bonds, alternative investments, real estate and cash. The results are displayed in Figure   3 . By 2010, target asset allocations had shifted significantly. Equities fell from a median target share of 58 percent to 52 percent, while bonds and real estate remained essentially even.
The largest increase was for alternative investments, which rose from 9 percent of the median target allocation in 2007, to 13 percent in 2010. In effect, the fall in equities was largely replaced by increased allocations to alternative investments. Moreover, heterogeneity in target portfolios between plans also increased. 
Risk of target asset allocations. Pension manager attitudes toward risk may have changed due
to adverse market performance in various ways. For instance, chastened by over-exposure to equities, some might shift assets toward fixed income investments, thinking more along the lines of asset/liability management or liability-driven investment. Others might seek to win it back losses by retaining or even increasing their risk exposure. Further, some might opt to 'double down.'
To our knowledge, no public plans publish their target portfolio risk in their annual reports or actuarial valuations. This constitutes a significant omission that makes it difficult for policymakers and the public to understand the contingent liabilities that they face. But with certain simplifying assumptions, we can estimate the risk of pension portfolios using projections from Wilshire Consulting (2011) regarding the mean returns, variances and covariances of a number of asset classes. Wilshire projects a median return of only around 6.5 percent. percent, a spread of 2.7 percentage points, while for 2010, the range was 11.5 to 14.2 percent, a spread that also equaled 2.7 percentage points. Yet, the standard deviation of portfolio standard deviations increased from one to 1.2 percentage points. Thus, while there was some widening of the differences in risk taken by plans, the more important trend seemed to be a simple shift upwards. Table 3 here.
This increase in average plan risk-taking would be anticipated to boost expected returns by approximately 0.15 percentage points, assuming that portfolios were on the efficient frontier. 
Figure 4 here
It is difficult to tell why certain plans took the paths they did. For instance, there is no simple correlation between the decline in a plan's funding ratio from 2007 through 2010 and its changed target portfolio risk. Of course, if some plans reacted to funding declines differently than others -some taking a more conservative route while others doubled down -such a pattern would be difficult to discern from the data available.
Conclusion
The financial crisis and the subsequent recession generated significant losses to pension assets, along with declines in plan funding rates. To date, no comprehensive analysis has been conducted of how public DB plans reacted to the volatility of markets since the financial crisis.
We have analyzed three aspects of pension funding: shifts in asset allocations due to changes in market values; shifts in target asset allocations due to decisions undertaken by plan managers; 
